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FORDHAM LAW REviEw

Last year the REvIEW had only $3.78 in its treasury at the end
of the year. The support of the alumni would have enabled the
Board to have printed a bigger and better paper. The only thing
which prevents the RxviEw this year from realizing its possibilities is lack of funds. Our REvIEw is now in the leading
libraries of the land. It represents Fordham. It should be a
matter of Fordham pride to have it as enterprising, as complete,
as authoritative, as any other college law review.
The present enrolment of the law school is supporting the
REvIEw loyally. With each alumnus doing his share, the circulation should soon reach the 1,000 mark. Once we are on a sound
financial footing we can commence producing a REvIEw to which
the profession generally will gladly subscribe. When the REviEw
becomes what we want to make it, a handy and accurate means
for a practicing lawyer to keep abreast of new professional developments, every Fordham graduite will share in the prestige which
it will attach to the Fordham name.
Please co-operate.
ANNOUNCEMENT
The Tenth Annual Dinner of the Fordham University School
of Law, originally scheduled for February 10th, will be held on
April 14th. The Hon. John Proctor Clarke, Presiding Justice of
the Appellate Division, First Department, consented to speak on
the earlier date, and it is sincerely hoped that he will find the new
date convenient. The committee is arranging a brief, but distinguished, toast list. Tickets will be four dollars. Announcement of the place and further details will appear in the New York
Law Journal.
RECENT DECISIONS.
DEBT OF LEGATEE To TESTATOR, AGAINST WHICH THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN, NOT A DEFENCE.-In an action at law

by a legatee against the executor of his testatrix for a legacy of
$20,000, the executor pleaded a debt of $30,000 owing to the
testatrix on promissory notes of the legatee. In his reply, the
plaintiff set up the Statute of Limitations against liability on the
notes. Held, the debt was barred by the Statute and recovery
sustained by the plaintiff for the amount of his legacy. (Kimball
v. Scribner, N. Y. Law Journal, Nov. 17, 1916.)
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There are numerous authorities, originating mostly in the Surrogates' Court, arising on accounting proceedings for the judicial
settlement of an estate, where it has been held that the executor
has an equitable lien and a right to retain out of a legacy an
amount due from the legatee to the testator, and that this right is
unaffected by the fact that such debt is barred by the Statute of
Limitations. (Rogers v. Madock, 45 Hun, 30; New York Public
Library v. Tilden, 39 Misc. 169; Leask v. Hoagland, 64 Misc.
156.) These cases proceed upon the theory that the Statute of
Limitations is a statute of repose. (Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N. Y.
295;) that the debt is part of the assets of the estate, and that the
legatee-debtor in good conscience should contribute the amount of
his indebtedness to the estate. Authorities in other jurisdictions
hold that in an action to recover a legacy it is not a good defence
that the legatee was indebted to the decedent on an obligation as to
which the Statute of Limitations has run. (Allen v. Edwards, 136
Mass. 138; Holt v. Libby, 80 Maine, 329.)
The Court here follows 136 Mass. 138 (supra), and while it
does not, of course, explicitly overrule the earlier decisions in
Surrogates' Court proceedings, it rejects the reasoning therein,
when offered as a basis of set-off in a common law action to
recover a legacy, and suggests that the spirit of the decision shall
hereafter guide the Surrogates' Court. This decision seems preferable in all respects to the rulings in the Surrogates' Court.
Admittedly, the debtor would have a valid defence to a suit brought
against him on the statute-barred debt by the executor. If the
decedent did not see fit to prosecute his action or abate the bequest
to the delinquent debtor, there seems to be no reason why the
Surrogates' Court should disregard the Statute.

LANDLORD AND TENANT; LANDLORD'S COVENANT TO REPAIR;
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH.-Plaintiff leased premises

from defendant under a lease whereby the latter agreed to keep
the premises, including windows, in repair and in safe condition;
thereafter the windows became insecurely fastened, whereupon
plaintiff notified defendant of that fact. Defendant promised to
make the necessary repairs but failed to do so. A window fell
out and injured 'a passerby, who sued plaintiff and recovered
judgment, which the latter satisfied. Plaintiff brings this action
to recover the amount of said judgment and the fee paid to his
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attorney. Held, both plaintiff and defendant were joint tort
feasors; they were in pari delicto, and defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings was granted. (Rubenstein v. Werbelowsky, N. Y. Law Journal, Dec. 7, 1916.)
A mere breach by a landlord of his agreement to make repairs
on demised premises renders him liable in damages only for the
cost of the repairs. (Schick v. Fleischhauser,26 App. Div. 210.)
Plaintiff in the principal case, however, based his claim upon the
theory that the landlord of premises abutting on a highway owes
the public the duty of maintaining such premises in a safe condition; that this obligation does not shift to his lessee when the
landlord expressly retains the duty to make repairs, that is, to
keep the premises in a safe condition; that as between landlord and
tenant the primary obligation is upon the former to maintain the
premises in a safe condition as to the public. Hence, if the tenant
is obliged to pay damages to a pedestrian because of injuries caused
by the landlord's failure to fulfil his obligation, there is a right of
recovery over, which is based not on the contractual obligation
of the lease, but upon the landlord's breach of his primary duty
to the public whereby a tort arose.
This appears to be a case of novel impression in this State, so
far as .the plaintiff's contention is concerned. It would seem that
where there is active negligence-an affirmative act-on the part
of the landlord, and entire freedom from participation in that
negligence on the part of the tenant, the former is responsible for
any damages incurred as a direct result of such negligence.
(Prescott v. Le Conte, 178 N. Y. 585.) In the case under discussion, however, it was not claimed that defendant did any affirmative
act whatever; on the contrary, it was found that plaintiff clearly
concurred in the negligence. Also, the measure of the lessee's
damage for the breach of the lessor's covenant is the amount of
such damages as result as an immediate consequence of such
breach. (24 Cyc. 922.) It could hardly be considered that the
injury to the passerby in the principal case was such an immediate
consequence of the landlord's breach as brought the case within
the rule just cited. Unquestionably, therefore, landlord's liability, if any, must be predicated, not upon his breach, but upon
his general duty to the public. While plaintiff's contention in this
case is ingenious, we do not believe the present tendency of the
courts is to enlarge upon the hitherto recognized duties owed by
the owners of real property to the general public.
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EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL

TRIAL-COMPETENCY

OF

WITNESS

IN

the trial of two joint wrongdoers, indicted
for tampering with the United States mail, a witness, who had
also been jointly indicated but pleaded guilty, was called by the
Government. Objection was taken on the. ground that he was
incompetent, having been convicted of forgery in New York.
At the time of his trial the witness was under 18 years of age and
was sent to Elmira Reformatory. Held, the witness was competent. (Theo. S. Rosen and Abraham Wagner v. United States,
U. S. C. C. A., 2d Circuit, New York Law Journal, Nov. 29, 1916.)
The competency of witnesses to testify in criminal cases in
the courts of the United States is determined by the common law
of the State where the trial is had as it was when such courts were
established, except in special cases where Congress may provide
otherwise. (Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; Maxey v.
United States, 207 Fed. 327; United States v. Sims, 161 id. 1008.)
In New York a person who had been convicted of treason,
felony or crimen falsi was incompetent. (People v. Whipple, 9
Cow. 707; People v. Park, 41 N. Y. 21.) Forgery Was included
in crimen falsi. (Maxey v. U. S., supra; Greenleaf on Evidence,
Sec. 373; Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 519, 520; Chamberlayne,
The Modern Law of Evidence, Sec. 3663, note 1.)
In the principal case the court does not expressly contest these
principles but holds that the facts do not require their application,
as the witness had been sent to a reformatory which did not have
the stigma of a prison sentence. On the contrary: "An examination of the adjudged cases in the various states of the Union where
substantially the same laws are in force will show that it is not the
commission of the crime nor the verdict of guilt, nor the punishment, nor the infamous nature of the punishment, but the final
judgment of the court that renders the culprit incompetent."
(Faunce v. People, 51 Ill. 311, 312; Dawley v. State, 4 Ind. 128,
129; Blaufus v. People, 69 N. Y. 107; People v. Whipple, supra.)
On the exact facts of the principal case New York, under the common law, held the witness incompetent. (People v. Park, supra.)
While these decisions are not binding on the court in the principal case, they are at least persuasive authority. (Thayer's
Cases on Evidence, p. 1070, note.)
The tendency of modern thought is towards the abolition of
the archaic rules which debarred criminals from taking the stand.
(New York Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 832; United States v.
Biebusch, 1 Fed. 213; United States v. Sims, supra; Greenleaf on
FEDERAL CouRT.-On

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

Evidence, Sec. 378 a, Chamberlayne, supra, See. 3667, Wigmore
on Evidence, Sec. 524, and cases cited by these authors.) In the
principal case the dissenting opinion holds that Congress alone
should make the change in the federal courts. (Maxey v. United
States, supra.) The result reached by the prevailing opinion is
undoubtedly correct, though the use of judicial legilation may be
questioned.

EVIDENCE-COMPETENCY

OF

EVIDENCE

TENDING

TO

SHOW

action
for personal injuries a physician who examined plaintiff was asked
on cross examination in whose interest he acted, and replied, "The
insurance company." The trial was interrupted and a juror withdrawn. Held, on appeal, that the inquiry was proper to show
the bias or interest of the witness. (Di Tommaso v. Syracuse
University, 172 App. Div. 34.)
In a negligence action evidence showing that the defence was
conducted by an insurance company is incompetent and sufficiently
dangerous to require reversal, unless it clearly appears that it
could not have influenced the verdict. (Simpson v. Foundation
Co., 201 N. Y. 479.) But, that it is relevant to show the bias or
interest of a witness cannot be doubted. (Platner v. Platner,
78 N. Y. 90.) This is told to us by the ordinary rules of logic,
and not the law of evidence. (Thayer's Cases on Evidence, second edition, note p. 229.) In the principal case the question and
answer clearly showed that the witness was interested in the
defence and therefore were relevant. The inquiry being relevant,
does any rule of the law of evidence operate to exclude it? It
was immaterial that the character of the witness' interest was
with an insurance company or that plaintiff's counsel expected
the answer elicited. (Odell v. Genesee Const. Co., 100 App. Div.
125.) The interest of a witness, as affecting his credibility, is
always material to go to the jury. (Schultz v. Third Ave. Ry.
Co., 89 N. Y. 242; Potter v. Brown, 197 N. Y. 288), and it is
our opinion that in the instant case the question objected to went
directly to the credibility of the witness. Therefore, as the bias
of the witness and his interest in the action were relevant and
material, it cannot be resisted that the inquiry was a proper
one. The admissibility of evidence is a question to be decided
by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and a
ruling admitting or rejecting evidence will not be reversed unless
THAT INSURANCE COMPANY IS DEFENDING ACTION.-In an
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there has been a manifest abuse of this discretion. (Meyer v.
Cullen, 54 N. Y. 392; People v. Ferrone, 204 N. Y. 551.)
This case makes an exception to a hitherto well-settled rule
in this State, and indicates that even where an inquiry reveals the
fact that an insurance company is interested in the litigation it
will be proper, if competent for any purpose, and that the trial
court's action in permitting the withdrawal of a juror because of
the asking and replying to a question indicating it is an abuse of
its discretion. There are decisions in other jurisdictions which
are in accord with this holding: (Hedlum v. Holy Terror Min.
Co., 92 N. W. [South Dakota], 31; Day v. Donohue, 62 N. J. L.,
280; Shoemaker v. Bryant Lumber Co., 27 Wash., 637).
We do not hesitate, therefore, to concur with the principal
case, and it is submitted that it accords with both principle and
authority.
SEPARATION-DUTY
By CONJUGAL

TO SUPPORT WIFE IMPOSED ON HUSBAND

RELATION.-Action by a wife for separation on

ground of cruelty, abandonment and failure to support. Defendant's answer set up as counterclaim an abandonment on part of
the plaintiff, for which a separation was asked. Held, where a
man has entered into matrimonial relation, there is an obligation
resting on him to support his wife and the issue of the marriage.
The husband is not relieved from that obligation by the fact that
wife is as much or more than he is to blame for uphappy relations
which .caused their separation. (Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, reported
in New York Law Journal, issue of November 11th, 1916, p.
539.)
It is elementary that "the conjugal relation imposes upon the
husband the duty to support the wife." (22 Amer. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, 78.) In equity and under the statutes, the generally recognized grounds for-the wife's right to an allowance for
separate maintenance are desertion or abandonment of the wife by
the husband without just cause, and cruelty, personal violence and
drunkenness. (21 Cyc. 1599 and cited cases.) The living of a
married woman separate and apart front her husband, in order
to entitle her to a decree for separate maintenance; must be without
her fault. (26 American Digest, Centennial Edition, p. 2844, and
cited cases.) An action for maihtenance cannot be brought by
a wife who has separated from her husband without just cause.
(7 Abbott's Digest, 707; Noe v. Noe, 13 Hun, 436.)
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The decision in the principal case, to the effect that the husband
is not relieved from the obligation of support by the fact that the
wife is as much to blame as he, or more, for the unhappy relations
which caused their separation, would seem to be a radical change
from the generally accepted view as given above. Given the fact
that the wife has left her husband without just cause, to say that
under such circumstances the husband would be liable for her
separate maintenance would seem to be unsound.

PRINCIPAL

AND SURETY-LIABILITY

ON BOND--RENEWALS.-

Plaintiff seeks to recover an original bond, guaranteeing the fidelity
of one of its employees, and on the several renewals thereof
declaring that the bond and each renewal created separate liabilities, and that defendant is liable within the yearly limit provided
for loss by defalcations of the employee during the designated
period of time.
Held, that plaintiff could recover despite the provisions of
the bond for losses through dishonesty of employee running from
January 1, 1905 to January 1, 1906 and renewed each year, the
last renewal being from January 1, 1911 to January 1, 1912 and
the defalcation occurring in 1907 and 1909. Chatham Real Estate
& Improvement Company v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Company (Ga.), 90 S.E., 88.
For and in consideration of a premium the defendant herein
executed its certain bond or obligation to reimburse plaintiff for
any defalcation of one Garden, its Treasurer, for a period of one
year, limiting its liability thereunder to $10,000. Subsequently
additional premiums were paid and the defendant extended its
liability under the said bond from year to year and up to and
including January 1, 1912. As each renewal was made a certain
certificate was annexed to the original bond reading as follows:
"CONTINUATION

CERTIFICATE

"In consideration of the sum of thirty-five dollars, the
United States. Fidelity & Guaranty Company hereby continues in force bond No. 1052-5 in the sum of ten thousand
dollars on behalf of F. W. Garden in favor of Chatham
R. E. & Imp. Co., for the period beginning the first day
of January, 1911, and ending on the first day of January,
1912, subject to all the covenants and conditions of said
original bond heretofore issued, dating from the first day
of January, 1905."
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A proviso in the original bond as follows;
"The company upon the execution of this bond, shall
not thereafter be responsible to the employer under any
bond previously issued to the employer on behalf of said
employ6; and upon the issuance of any bond subsequent
thereto upon said employ6 in favor of said employer, all
responsibility hereunder shall cease and determine, it being
mutually understood that it is the intention of this provision
that but one (the last) bond shall be in force at one time
unless otherwise stipulated between the employer and the
company."
indicated that at no time should the liability of the defendant exceed the amount limited in the original bond. In spite of this fact
the Court held that each renewal was separate and distinct liability
to the extent of the amount limited in the bond for each year, so
that instead of being liable in toto for $10,000, the defendant was
liable to the extent of $10,000 for each and every year. This
decision reverses that of John Church Company v. Aetna Indemnity Company, 13 Ga. App., 826; 80 S. E., 1093, which was a suit
upon a similar bond, and the court now construes such a bond with
its renewals as extensions of liability and not as limitations.
Few of the States have as yet taken this view, but Georgia is
now in accord with New York and Mississippi. In New York
the first case on the point was that of Hawley v. United States
Fidelity. Company, 100 App. Div. 12; affirmed 184 N. Y., 549,
which reversed all prior decisions, and has now been followed by
a more recent one in the case of Alex. Campbell Milk Company v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 161 App. Div:, 738,
which substantiates the doctrine of the extension of liability rather
than that of limitation.
Mississippi reaches the same conclusion and in the case of
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Williams, 49 So.
Rep., 742, says that each renewal stands upon its separate consideration and provides for its designated period of time and thus
creates cumulative liability even against the express intention of
the contract.

BANKRUPTCY-LIABILITY FOR OBTAINING PROPERTY BY FALSE

PRETENSES NOT RELEASED BY DISCHARGE.-A bond was obtained

from a surety company by false representations and the company,
having been compelled to pay the bond, thereafter sued the in-
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sured because of his false statements as to his financial standing
and obtained judgment against him for the penalty and interest.
Held, the discharge of the insured in bankruptcy does not cancel
such judgment under Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Law, reversing
the ruling of the Appellate Division in favor of the defendant
Dunfee. (Matter of Dunfee, 219 New York, 189.)
Section 17 of the Bankrjiptcy Law provides that "A discharge
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts
except such as * * * (2) are liabilities for obtaining property
by false pretenses or false representations."
The case turns on the interpretation of the word "property"
as used in the above quoted section. The Court in the case of
Phelps v. People, 72 New York, 334, in defining the words "personal property" as used in thi revised statutes, said that "The
term personal property (as used in this chapter), shall be construed to mean goods, chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action,
and all written instruments by which any pecuniary obligation,
or any right or title to property, real or personal, shall be created,
acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, disharged or
diminished." A like interpretation was put on the above section
of the revised statutes in Bork v. People, 91 N. Y., 5. The word
"property" (in People v. Warden, 145 A. D., 861), was held "to
embrace every species of valuable right and interest, and whatever
tends, in any degree, no matter how small, to deprive one of that
right, or interest, deprives him of his property."
At common law no such liberal interpretation was apparently
given. "Property" is defined by Blackstone (1 Comm., 138) as the
"free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his (a man's) acquisitions,
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the
land." Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines "property" as an "exclusive right to things, containing not only a right to use those
things, but a right to dispose of them, either by exchanging them,
or giving them away to any other person without consideration,
or even throwing them away." These last definitions were quoted
with approval in two early New York cases, Wynehamer v. People,
13 New York, 396, and Sherman v. Elder, 24 New York, 384.
As indicated above, however, the subsequent New York decisions
have given a much wider scope to the definition of the word
"property," as have most jurisdictions.

